Public Law 280

Tribal authority over members is "primeval" and inherent — not delegated by the federal government. Tribal courts and federal courts are separate sovereigns. Foundation for Lara and the Duro fix.

USE: ATN tribal court derives its authority from inherent pre-constitutional sovereignty, not from any federal grant. PL280 cannot extinguish what Wheeler called "primeval."

Three-step diminishment framework. Reservation status persists absent express congressional disestablishment. State conduct, demographic change, and exercise of state jurisdiction are the WEAKEST evidence — they cannot create disestablishment Congress did not authorize. Doctrinal forerunner of McGirt.

USE: California's 70+ years of PL280 jurisdiction does NOT diminish the Mendocino Reservation. Solem makes that the weakest possible evidence of disestablishment, and there is no statute disestablishing it.

ICWA gives tribal courts exclusive jurisdiction over reservation-domiciled Indian children, regardless of physical birth location. The model for how Congress can carve subject-area tribal jurisdiction back out of PL280's overlay.

USE: ICWA operates as a federal override of PL280 in child welfare. The same legislative pattern can restore tribal jurisdiction in any subject area Congress chooses.

A CALIFORNIA Indian Country case from the Hoopa Valley Reservation. Confirms that California reservations created by federal Executive Order ARE "Indian Country" for all federal-law purposes. Settles the foundational question for ATN's Mendocino claim.

USE: The Mendocino Reservation (1856 Executive Order) is fully Indian Country. Federal Indian law applies — including the trust doctrine, the canon of construction, and all the limits PL280 itself doesn't displace.

IRA § 5 (25 U.S.C. § 5108) preempts state taxes on trust property — including permanent improvements built on trust land. Off-reservation tribal commercial activity is generally subject to nondiscriminatory state tax absent express congressional preemption.

USE: ATN's Mendocino trust acreage and all permanent improvements on it are exempt from California property taxes. Strategic implication: keep economic activity on trust land where the protection is strongest.

9-0: Comprehensive federal-tribal regulatory programs preempt state regulation — even over non-Indians on the reservation. Doctrinal bridge from Bracker (1980) to Cabazon (1987). Tribal hunting/fishing programs displace state regulatory authority.

USE: ATN's cannabis cultivation/processing/dispensary licensing program — comprehensive, on-reservation, federally compatible — is structurally identical to Mescalero's pattern. California's parallel cannabis-control regime cannot reach into ATN's reservation under Bracker / Mescalero preemption.

Federal common-law cause of action for Indian land claims. The Nonintercourse Act voids ab initio any state acquisition of tribal land without federal approval. State statutes of limitations don't run against federal Indian land claims. Later cabined by City of Sherrill (2005) for sovereignty reassertion, but the damages doctrine survives.

USE: Federal common-law damages claims for historical land losses remain available. ATN's land-back strategy still has doctrinal anchor here, alongside the IRA trust process Sherrill expressly endorsed.

Black Hills takings. Trust duty has teeth. Plenary power is bounded by constitutional duties — federal action against tribal interests is reviewable as a Fifth Amendment taking. The Sioux Nation has refused to accept the $1B+ award; the Black Hills are not for sale.

USE: Doctrinal grounding for retrocession argument — federal action that imposed PL280 on tribes without consent violates the trust duty.

Tribes have inherent power to tax non-Indian businesses operating on tribal land. The taxing power flows from sovereignty itself, not from federal delegation. Foundation for ATN's cannabis-license fee model.

USE: Every cannabis license fee, severance tax, and business privilege charge ATN imposes on non-Indian operators on trust land is grounded in Merrion. PL280 did not extinguish this power.

Tribal taxing authority requires no approval from the Secretary of the Interior. The power to tax is inherent and can be exercised unilaterally — no federal sign-off needed.

USE: ATN's cannabis licensing fees need no BIA or Interior Department approval. Merrion + Kerr-McGee = inherent power + unilateral exercise.

Tribal sovereign immunity extends to commercial activity, on or off the reservation. Bay Mills's predecessor; the Court refused to carve out a commercial-activity exception. Only Congress can abrogate; only tribes can waive.

USE: ATN's federal contracting, GSA work, and all commercial dealings off-reservation remain protected by sovereign immunity. PL280 transferred a forum, not the immunity that protects the tribe as an entity.

Modern reaffirmation of tribal sovereign immunity — even for off-reservation commercial activity. Only Congress can abrogate; only tribes can waive — both must be express and unambiguous. The Court refused a direct invitation to limit Kiowa.

USE: ATN cannot be sued by California or any state actor without express congressional abrogation or express tribal waiver. PL280 transferred a forum, not the immunity that prevents the forum being used against ATN as an entity.

Tribal jurisdiction over intra-Indian crimes is the default rule. Federal authority requires express congressional action — silence means tribal authority controls. Bryan v. Itasca later applied the same rule to PL280's civil reach.

USE: The "express action" rule. PL280 must be read narrowly; gaps default to tribal authority.

Origin of "plenary power" — and a CALIFORNIA case, arising on the Hoopa Valley Reservation. Federal authority over Indians is exclusive; states have no analogous power. Justice Miller called states tribes' "deadliest enemies."

USE: Federal Indian law's plenary-power doctrine literally originates in Northern California Indian Country. State authority is foreclosed at its root.

Tribal sovereignty pre-dates and is independent of the U.S. Constitution. Tribal courts derive authority from inherent sovereignty, not from federal grant. The Bill of Rights does not constrain tribal courts of its own force.

USE: ATN tribal court authority is inherent — PL280 cannot extinguish what the Constitution did not create.

First case in the Marshall Trilogy. Established that only the federal government can extinguish Indian title — not states, not counties, not private buyers. Tribes hold a perpetual right of occupancy that no entity below the federal sovereign may touch. The Doctrine of Discovery rationale is now under sustained challenge (Vatican repudiation 2023; Justice Gorsuch's critique in McGirt).

USE: California cannot extinguish or burden tribal land title under P.L. 280. The federal exclusivity rule is a hard ceiling on state authority over Indian Country land.

Chief Justice Marshall named the constitutional category that holds tribal sovereignty: "domestic dependent nations" whose relationship to the United States "resembles that of a ward to his guardian." This is the source of the federal trust doctrine and the textual root of tribal pre-constitutional sovereignty.

USE: Tribes are nations, not racial groups or private associations. Federal trust duty constrains every actor — including states acting under P.L. 280.

Chief Justice Marshall: Indian nations are "distinct, independent political communities" and state laws "can have no force" within their boundaries. This is the constitutional baseline — states have NO inherent jurisdiction over Indian Country.

USE: Foundational argument that P.L. 280 cannot grant what states do not inherently possess without constitutional amendment.

"If crime was by or against an Indian, tribal jurisdiction or that expressly conferred on other courts by Congress has remained exclusive." Reaffirms that tribal/federal exclusivity is the default, not state concurrent authority.

USE: Establishes that tribes always had exclusive jurisdiction — P.L. 280 was an intrusion on the default, not a restoration of order.

Justice Gorsuch: Reservations persist unless clearly disestablished by Congress. State jurisdiction does not automatically attach because of time, demographic changes, or state assumption of governance. Indian Country remains Indian Country.

USE: Even if California has exercised P.L. 280 jurisdiction for 70+ years, that does not extinguish tribal sovereignty or validate the original usurpation.

Created the reserved-rights doctrine: when the federal government creates a reservation, it implicitly reserves enough water (and other resources) to fulfill the reservation's purposes. These rights date from reservation creation, take priority over state-law claims, cannot be lost by non-use, and cannot be regulated by states.

USE: ATN's water, fishery, and natural resource rights at Mendocino are senior to virtually every California user — and California cannot regulate them under P.L. 280 or any other authority.

Federal classifications based on tribal membership are political, not racial — they refer to membership in a federally recognized political entity, not a racial group. Indian-specific federal laws receive only rational-basis review. This is the constitutional firewall under all of Title 25, ICWA, VAWA STCJ, and tribal preference programs.

USE: When California or any party argues that tribal preference, tribal jurisdiction, or tribal-only programs are racial discrimination, Morton is the answer. Reaffirmed by Brackeen (2023).